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I. INTRODUCTION
As every one who has completed the first year of law school knows, a student’s
“1L” year is filled with long reading assignments, strange Latin terms, and professors
who could probably teach Socrates a thing or to about his “method.” From August until
May, a first year student’s time in and out of the classroom is a whirlwind educational
experience with little free time to eat or sleep and never enough time to brief cases for the
following day. However, when May finally does arrive, and the last exam, be it
Contracts, Constitutional law or Property, is completed and turned into the professor, a
new, completely different legal experience begins. It becomes time to move from the
world of leaping onto moving trains with a bag full of firecrackers and an ensuing
explosion with a force powerful enough to topple a heavy scale onto an unsuspecting
pedestrian,1 to a place where the bad guys are real and the cases rarely if ever involve a
banana peel: the summer clerkship.
A summer clerk’s job varies. One moment a law clerk could be conducting
stimulating legal research that he or she would be happy to do without any compensation
whatsoever while the next moment, the clerk could be given an assignment involving
thousands of mind-numbing documents that no amount of money could justify doing.
After an intense spring filled with an uncountable number of cover letters,
resumes, and follow-up phone calls, I was lucky enough to obtain a clerkship in the State
Attorney’s Office. Though I have come across many of the typical issues that a
practicing attorney in the field of criminal law might expect, such as reasonable
suspicion, search and seizure, constructive possession, and improper identifications, there
have been one or two situations that have arisen that would surprise and possibly amuse
even the most seasoned legal advocate.
Recently, I was given an assignment involving a motion that challenged the
constitutionality of the counterfeit license plate statute in the Florida Criminal Code.
Needless to say, when the assistant state attorney handed me the defense counsel’s
motion, it contained a sticky pad note with the words “have fun.”
After browsing the document for just five minutes, my second semester Criminal
Law class came flashing before my eyes: actus reus, mens rea, statutory construction,
plain meaning, legislative intent. The terms were flying around in my head so quickly,
and I wondered how I would ever come up with a sufficiently convincing enough
argument for the assistant state attorney who had given me the assignment to turn into the
judge. Luckily, I was able to revert back to the basic concepts and material that I learned
throughout my first year and managed to draft a winning argument that made me the self
proclaimed hero of the office.

II. THE LEGAL QUESTION
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Substantive due process is the doctrine stating that the Due Process Clauses of the
5th and 14th Amendments require legislation to be fair and reasonable in content and to
further a legitimate governmental objective.2 Florida Statute Section 320.26(1)(a)
prohibits the possession a counterfeit license plate. The offense has no listed criminal
element. The legal question then is: Does a statute which punishes the possession of a
counterfeit license plate violate the hallowed principle of substantivedue process if the
law does not contain an explicit scienter element?

III. THE DISCUSSION: How do we determine if the law is
constitutional?
There is very little case law involving the counterfeit license plate statute in
question and absolutely no authority governing its constitutionality. For that reason, we
start our journey by keeping one founded legal principle in mind. Courts are obligated to
interpret statutes in a way that avoids labeling the law as unconstitutional.3 This
established common law point encourages the interpreter of a statute which lacks a
specific mens rea term to construe the law as containing an implicit criminal intent
component. If mens rea is implied, then any constitutional problems are resolved, and as
long as it is fair to do so, courts should construe a statute to avoid constitutional issues.4
1. So, is it fair to imply a mens rea term into the law?
The portion of the statute in question is as follows: “No person shall counterfeit
registration license plates, validation stickers, or mobile home stickers, or have in his or
her possession any such plates or stickers” (emphasis added).5 The conflict in this case
involves the portion in italics. Noticeably absent from the italicized portion of the statute
is an explicit requirement of criminal intent. However, in spite of the lack of an overt
scienter requirement, because the Legislature is responsible for promulgating the law,
determining whether or not mens rea is an essential element of an offense is a question of
legislative intent.6
The first step in determining the intentions of the legislature is to analyze the
actual language of the statute.7 As we have noted, the italicized portion of the statute
above makes no reference to any knowledge requirement, i.e. knowing that that the plates
or stickers are counterfeit. The argument could then be made that this lack of a
specifically stated mens rea requirement translates to no mens rea requirement at all and
thus, a violation of due process. However, the absence of a mens rea requirement does
not necessarily mean that the Legislature intended to dispense with a conventional
scienter element.8 Mens rea may be implied from the terms of a statute even if the statute
itself lacks an implicit criminal intent component.9
If statutory intent is unclear from the plain language of the law (and in this case it
seems to be), then we move to the next step, applying the rules of statutory construction
and exploring the legislative history to determine the intentions of the legislature.10
Unfortunately, the history of section 320.26 gives us no assistance in ascertaining the
Legislature’s intentions when the law was first adopted or amended. Consequently, the
burden to interpret the statute in question falls to case law.
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As we all learned in our respective criminal law classes, actus reus is the wrongful
deed that comprises the physical elements of a crime,11 and mens rea is defined as the
mental state which the prosecution must prove in order to secure a conviction, i.e.
criminal intent.12 Traditionally at common law, all crimes consisted of both a mens rea
and an actus reus.13 As a result, “the general rule was that mens rea was a necessary
element in the indictment and proof of every crime.”14 Moreover, mens rea has been
labeled “the rule rather of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American
criminal jurisprudence.15
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that a statute must be
interpreted in light of the background rules of the common law, in which a requisite
guilty state of mind is firmly established.16 Additionally, Florida courts had held that
there is a presumption that statutes contain a general mens rea requirement when an
express intent is absent,17 and this point of law has been echoed in our nation’s highest
court as well.18 Additionally, offenses that do not include a mens rea are disfavored, and
it has been recently suggested that either an express or implied criminal intent is required
as an element of every criminal offense.19
With all these points of law in mind, one might think that our journey has ended,
but we first must consider another demon from second semester Criminal Law, strict
liability offenses. Only then may we properly determine if section 320.26(1)(a) contains
an implicit mens rea element or if it is substantively unconstitutional.
2. Strict liability crimes
In our American governmental system of checks and balances, it is the duty of the
Legislature to promulgate laws.20 It may develop new statutes, reword existing statutes
or repeal older, outdated laws in order to keep up with the changing times. Thus, it
logically follows that the Legislature is vested with the authority to definethe elements of
a crime.21 As a result, regardless of what any judge or justice might imply to the
contrary, it is the Legislature that has the authority to determine whether or not scienter is
an essential element of a statutory offense.22
When there is no mens rea requirement, an offense is thus labeled as a strict
liability crime.23 These crimes, which only include an actus reus as an elemental
requirement, have been addressed by the United States Supreme Court and have been
repeatedly upheld.24 Strict liability legislation is meant to serve as a way of regulating
certain conduct.25 Certain activities are strictly prohibited and punished despite the
intentions of the actor, be they harmless or criminal. The penalties are imposed and no
criminal mindset is required due to the Legislature’s desire to regulate certain types of
potentially harmful or injurious items.26 The idea is that due to the character of the item,
a person should immediately be aware that it is susceptible to strict regulation.27
Though the specific purpose of license plates is not stated within any of the
statutes pertaining to license plates, their purpose is implicitly obtained from analyzing
Florida Statute section 320.02. License plates help to ensure that all vehicles driven on
the streets and highways are properly registered so that the safety of other drivers on the
road may be assured.28 License plates assist in protecting the true owner of a vehicle
from theft; they help to guarantee to others on the road that the person behind the wheel
is proficient in the art of driving, and they assure to other motorists that the vehicle being
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driven has proper accident insurance.29 (There are several different purposes of vehicle
registration, and the benefits listed above certainly do not exhaust the list). Therefore, it
is not far fetched to assume that a person might immediately realize that counterfeiting a
license plate or being in possession of a counterfeit plate is prohibited because it
completely defeats the purpose of the statute. A counterfeit license plate, nullifies all the
guarantees and assurances that a proper registration license plate includes.
Despite the compelling legal reasoning above, the argument will be made that
because violation of section 320.26(1)(a) results in the commission of a third degree
felony punishable up to five years,30 the statute should be declared unconstitutional
because its lack a mens rea requirement. Though strict liability statutes are not
unconstitutional simply because they impose imprisonment as a punishment,31 the strict
liability offenses that include harsh penalties have been generally limited to statutes that
regulate potentially harmful or injurious items such as hand grenades or guns or deadly
chemicals.32
Therefore, as long as fundamental notions of justice are not offended, the
legislature is well within its police power to declare an act criminal regardless of the
mental state of the actor,33 even if violation of the offense would result in a prison term.
While imposing no mens rea requirement on a statute regulating a “deleterious device,”34
appears to be constitutional, it is difficult to apply the same line of reasoning to a statute
prohibiting the possession of a counterfeit license plate. To my knowledge, a person can
do much more damage with one hand grenade, than with one thousand xeroxed paper
temporary license tags.
3. Safeguarding Innocent Conduct and Punishing Criminal Activity
It is logical then that possessing a counterfeit license plate, which carries with it a
penalty of imprisonment of up to 5 years,35 would contain a knowledge requirement in
order to protect lawful conduct. “Knowledge is desirable in order to safeguard innocent
persons from being made the victims of unlawful acts perpetrated by others, and of which
they have no knowledge.”36
The Florida Legislature could not possibly have intended to completely exclude a
mens rea requirement when drafting section 320.26(1)(a). In United States Gypsum Co.,
the Supreme Court noted that “certainly far more than the simple omission of the
appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an
intent requirement.”37 In more simple terms, just because you don’t see it, it doesn’t
mean it’s not there.
If the lack of specific criminal intent language translated to no requirement at all,
then a host of seemingly innocent, law-abiding behavior would thus become
criminalized. For example, section 320.26(1)(a) could be used to convict a postman
delivering a package which contains a counterfeit license plate. The postman would
technically be in possession of the illegal item , subject to a five year prison term.38
Another example involves the unsuspecting driver who borrows a vehicle from a friend.
If the car bears a counterfeit license plate, the driver, who was only using the vehicle to
visit his sick mother in Tallahassee, would be guilty of a third degree felony.39
Undoubtedly, the Florida Legislature did not intend these drastic results when it
promulgated the legislation in question.
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4. A Similar Situation: food stamp fraud
The law in controversy in Liparota v. United States is very much like section
320.26(1)(a). Liparota involved a federal law governing food stamp fraud.40 The statute
provided that “whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons
or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by the statute or the regulations” is
subject to a fine and imprisonment.41 Both this federal statute and the Florida statute in
question involve possessing certain items, and neither law makes reference to any
specific criminal intent to accompany the actus reus of illegal possession. In other words,
simply possessing the “contraband” could be a violation of the statute despite a complete
and total lack of any criminal intent. The Court in Liparota found that, in order to
safeguard innocent conduct, implied in section 2024 is the requirement that the
Government prove during prosecution that the food stamps were acquired in a manner
unauthorized by statute or regulations.42 To be guilty of illegally possessing food stamps,
the Government must show that the defendant knew or should have known that his
conduct was illegal.
5. One Final Point: The principle of lenity
In order for a judge to grant a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute,
it must first be determined that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute
would be valid.43 This is a difficult task to accomplish as any given statute has two
potential interpretations, one constitutional and one unconstitutional. Also, courts have
established a founded principle of lenity when dealing with potentially ambiguous
criminal statutes.44 This principle was developed in order to give fair warning concerning
illegal conduct when the legislature’s intent is unclear.45 A mens rea element to section
320.26(1)(a) would be consistent with the concept of lenity by giving offenders of the
statute the benefit of the doubt in terms of their criminal intent until the prosecution
proved otherwise. This reading of the statute would be seen as a substantively
constitutional interpretation.
6. How should a Court interpret § 320.26(1)(a)?
“The presumption in favor of scienter requires a court to read into a statute only
that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent
conduct.”46 This means that if a general criminal intent is sufficient to separate innocent
behavior from criminal acts then only general intent will be implied. Accordingly, if a
more precise brand of intent is necessary to make a distinction between criminal and noncriminal acts, then specific intent will be read into the statute. (Note: Since there does
not appear to be one accepted definition for each phrase, to define general and specific
intent at this point, while it may seem logical, would only result in unnecessary confusion
not germane to the point of this article. Specific intent is a form of intent above and
beyond the level of general intent. Let us leave it at that.)
The general criminal intent component which the Supreme Court found in
Liparota is the same requirement which could be reasonably read into Florida Statute
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section 320.26(1)(a). General criminal intent would suffice to separate wrongful
behavior from innocent activity, and it would extinguish any potential constitutional
dilemmas. To require knowledge of possession of a counterfeit license plate is not overly
burdensome on the prosecution, and it protects those people who have not purposely
violated the law.
Therefore, the statute should be interpreted as follows: No person shall
counterfeit registration license plates, validation stickers, or mobile home stickers, or
have in his or her possession any such plates or stickers, knowing said plates or stickers
are counterfeit.

IV. CONCLUSION: Where do we stand?
In the case of Florida Statute section 320.26(1)(a), a challenge to its
constitutionality in an appellate court would be a case of first impression. Until the point
that this issue reaches a higher court, we, as legal scholars in Florida, are left with this
sole document as the onlysource which makes even the vaguest refe rence to this
unchallenged law. As a result, this issue has been appearing frequently in recent months
in the circuit courts. In my final month at the state attorney’s office in which I worked, I
became aware of at least three challenges to the constitutionality of this law.
The arguments that have been made in favor of section 320.26(1)(a) are not
complicated in nature. As we all know from our first year Criminal Law final exams,
mens rea is not an issue specific to one type of offense. It transcends the entire criminal
code and is found in various forms depending on the severity of the conduct being
prohibited. Thus, even if the reasoning and argument found in this article fail to persuade
an appellate level judge in the future, the legal principles and case law cited can be used
to formulate similar mens rea arguments for any number of different statutes which lack
an explicit scienter requirement.
However, regardless of the simplicity of the legal reasoning behind this article,
the fact still remains that this issue is undecided on any court level where stare decisis
would eventually rule, and thus the circuit courtsare free to rule in any way they see fit.
Hopefully, an attorney will eventually appeal a circuit court decision so that some
precedent can be set for the future. But, until that one day when Florida Statute section
320.26(1)(a) is challenged in a district court of appeal or in front of the Florida Supreme
Court, take pleasure in the fact that you have read Florida’s utmost (and only) legal
“authority” on the constitutionality of the counterfeit license plate statute.

1

Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (N.Y. 1928).

2

Black’s Law Dictionary 211 (New Pocket ed. 1996).

3

State v. Giorgetti, 868 So.2d 512, 518 (Fla. 2004).

4

Cashatt v. State, 873 So.2d 430, 436 (1st DCA 2004).

5

Fla. Stat. § 320.26(1)(a).
7

6

Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736, 741 (Fla. 1996).

7

Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793 (1994).

8

Id.

9

21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 129.

10

BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287, 289 (Fla.2003).

11

Blacks Law Dictionary 14 (Pocket Edition 1996).

12

Id. at 412.

13

Giorgetti, 868 at 512.

14

Chicone, 684 at 741 (upholding conviction of possession of cocaine and paraphernalia
even though neither counts alleged the element of knowledge).
15

16

United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436, 98 S.Ct. 2864 (1978).
Staples, 511 at 605.

17

Cashatt, 873 at 436 (upholding an internet child solicitation statute that lacked an
explicit scienter requirement).
18

Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269, 120 S.Ct. 2159 (2000)(implying a general
criminal intent requirement into a lesser included robbery statute in order to separate
wrongful conduct from innocent, lawful actions).
19

Chicone, 684 at 743.

20

See State Dept. of Children and Family Services v. I.B., 891 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 1st DCA
2005).
21

Chicone, 684 at 741.

22

Id.

23

Black’s Law Dictionary 157 (New Pocket ed. 1996).

24

United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 42 S.Ct. 301 (1922).

25

Staples, 511 U.S. at 607.

8

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

See Fla. Stat. § 320.02 (listing all the requirements for proper vehicle registration).

29

Id.

30

Fla. Stat. § 775.082(3)(d).

31

Dreamland Ballroom and Social Dance Club v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 789 So.2d
1099, 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
32

See, U. S. v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564-565, 91
S.Ct. 1697 (1971)(listing the limited situations in which strict liability offenses have been
upheld).
33

21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 144.

34

International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 at 565.

35

Fla. Stat. § 775.082(3)(d).

36

Giorgetti, 868 at 516.

37

United States Gypsum Co., 438 at 438.

38

See § 775.082(3)(d).

39

See id.

40

Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 105 S.Ct. 2084 (1985).

41

7 U.S.C.A. § 2024 (2004).

42

Liparota, 471 at 433

43

Cashatt, 873 at 434

44

Id. at 427

45

Id.

46

Carter, 530 at 269.

9

